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SettleBot: A Negotiation Model for the Agent
Based Commercial Grid
Florian Lang
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Abstract: Market-driven sharing of distributed computational resources requires
coordination support that can be provided by distributed problem solving (software agent technology). Multiple-issue negotiation among autonomous software
agents allows the efficient alignment of resource consumers’ demand profiles and
the service capabilities of resource providers. To address the inefficiencies of negotiations on imperfect markets, the negotiation model suggested by the SettleBot
research effort includes both self-interested negotiations driven by a heuristic
strategy and a joint-gains approach to win/win-negotiations. While finding joint
gains under imperfect information is a well-known problem with approaches relating to simulated annealing as common approximate solutions, self-interested
negotiations in a dynamically evolving environment require intelligent agents that
retrieve, process and leverage knowledge about the world state. Superior strategy
solutions in given market scenarios are identified using a genetic learning algorithm.
Keywords: Grid Computing, Negotiation, Multi-Agent Systems

1

Commercial Grids

Successful grid implementations in high performance scientific applications have
led to grid technology as a promising approach to cost cutting in professional
business environments. Business cases around the world show that grid computing
has already found its way to the companies’ data centers. The goal of grid enabled
business applications is to reduce the cost and boost the efficiency of heavy duty
application services that rely on highly available network infrastructure, data
processing and storage. The principle of sharing computational resources dynamically among applications is enabled by a grid infrastructure (grid fabric) and a grid
management appliance that allocates idle resources to service consuming applications.
While cooperative sharing of resources can be readily assumed in scientific areas
of application, it cannot provide for an allocation approach in competitive environments. Self-interested players will only share their resources across profit-
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centers or companies, if they are compensated for the exchanged services. The
SettleBot project aims at providing a market based allocation mechanism for the
exchange of grid services in competitive environments (referred to as “grid market” in the remainder of this article). A commercial grid allows the virtualization
of resources across separate budget entities (profit centers, companies). Idle resources become chargeable grid service offers. On the client side, excess demand
for service resources may be satisfied by finding and using idle resources via the
commercial grid. Thus, a subsystem of the grid may efficiently size its resource
pool well below peak load requirements.
A grid market must support flexible pricing to ensure an efficient match of supply
and demand. Beginning with the Harvard PDP-1 auction in 1968 (see [Suth68])
many research efforts have evaluated auctioning as an economic mechanism for
the valuation and exchange of computational resources (see for example
[Chen+02; Gagl+95; ReNi98; Wols+01]). However, auction mechanisms require
fixed goods. An auctioneer will offer a fixed service level agreement (service type,
execution time, resource usage) that is valued by a bidder’s decision function. The
SettleBot project extends this approach by providing a mechanism that allows
agreeing upon any attribute of the SLA, including price. A grid market that supports such multi-issue negotiation allows efficient resource usage by matching
suppliers’ and demanders’ preference structures with respect to all aspects of a
service level agreement. The project’s goal is to design negotiating software
agents that autonomously negotiate for multiple-attribute grid service contracts.
A computational grid is an IT-infrastructure that integrates a pool of heterogeneous resources and presents them to users as a single machine (virtualization). Besides joining resources that are heterogeneous in terms of platform and performance, grid computing extends cluster computing by considering resource failure a
standard operating condition. The grid is a highly dynamic computing infrastructure, where resources are merged and unmerged depending on whether they are
available (up and idle) or unavailable (down or busy). While first generation computational grids involved proprietary solutions, second generation grids introduced
middleware as a framework to cope with scalability, heterogeneity and efficient
resource allocation. Third generation computational grids follow a serviceoriented approach, are metadata-enabled like web services and may exhibit autonomic features [Dero+03].
State of the Art-Grid Middleware applies centralized job scheduling algorithms for
resource allocation. Job scheduling is a suitable approach for managing resources
in control by a central grid manager. Separate budget scenarios where grid resources are distributed among independent resource owners require mutual consent on which resources may be scheduled to run a job and when. In a commercial
grid, this mutual consent is reached by a market mechanism implemented in the
middleware layer that allows resource valuation and exchange. We consider the
commercial grid a third generation computational grid that applies market based
resource allocation (see Figure 1).

SettleBot: A Negotiation Model for the Agent Based Commercial Grid
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Figure 1: Grid Evolution

Commercial grids allow service consumers to noticeably reduce their application
total cost of ownership by outsourcing peak loads to the most cost-efficient
source. Given that otherwise idle resources are available for grid service insourcing, cost cutting effects can be dramatic. A resource owner who has got nonstorable, idle resources to spare will accept any compensation exceeding transaction cost.

2

Automated Negotiation and Knowledge Processing

The operative interdependencies that arise from interweaving businesses pose major coordination challenges. In competitive environments, coordination as an instrument of managing interdependencies is restricted by contradictory goals of the
interdependent parties. Negotiation is an instrument of resolving these conflicts.
Machine negotiation is applied to allow short-termed, flexible contracting among
autonomous systems at very low cost per transaction. The SettleBot research effort
aims at developing a heuristic negotiation model that deals with the inefficiencies
prevailing in real-world settings. SettleBot’s agents try to maximize their payoff
by applying a heuristic strategy that processes the agents’ knowledge about their
environment, their opponents and their own goals. Since information about other
agents’ preferences is limited in competitive settings, automated negotiations
driven by heuristic strategies usually result in Pareto-dominated contracts. This
downside to heuristic negotiations is met by SettleBot’s two-phased negotiation
protocol.
In the first phase, the agents apply self-interested negotiation strategies to reach a
preliminary agreement. This agreement reflects the agents’ individual success in
gaining maximum utility with respect to their individual preference models. The
first phase may be characterized as a win/lose-negotiation where an agent maximizes its payoff on another agent’s expense (“dividing the pie”). The second
phase aims at correcting inefficiencies of the preliminary agreement by searching
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for joint gains (“enlarging the pie”) while preserving the payoff distribution the
agents gained from the first phase. Thus, the agent that has a stronger negotiation
stance (e.g. little competition by identical or substitutional service offerings), uses
a better strategy or leverages other competitive edges like additional or more accurate knowledge, better knowledge processing skills and so forth still “wins” the
negotiation while both sides yield additional payoff.
Centralized auctioning mechanisms assume goods or services of equivalent quality that are distinguishable only by price. On commodity markets, the quality of
variable goods and services (i.e. agricultural products, bandwidth) is standardized
by a common quality statement (commoditization), thereby avoiding the transaction cost of consumers and providers coming to individual terms on variable quality features. Contract variables other than price are non-negotiable on commodity
markets, thus obscuring additional profit opportunities (“leaving money on the table”). Multiple-issue negotiation allows preference-driven bilateral contract customization at the attribute level, so contractors are awarded a better fit of consumer needs and provider productivity.
Concerning a resource management system’s user interface, user attention must be
considered the scarcest resource to be managed. Therefore, hiding the complexities of real-time multi-attribute resource allocation from users is a major design
goal. Enabling agents with autonomous knowledge retrieval and processing abilities is a design principle.
User
User Interface
Interface

Application
Application Interface
Interface
Implied Knowledge

Sensors

Sensor
Drivers

Agent
Effector
Drivers

Effectors

Given
Knowledge

Negotiation Strategy

Figure 2: Knowledge Processing Architecture

Transaction support in the SettleBot system aims at reducing user involvement in
real-time grid service allocation settings to a budget decision and a non-recurring
elicitation of the user’s trade-off weight concerning time vs. money. Goals and
preferences other than budget and the trade-off weight are extracted by an application interface (see Figure 2). A sensors stack allows an agent to observe dynamically changing environmental conditions that must be considered by the agent’s
negotiation strategy (competing offers, time, price history, …). Sensor drivers
process, aggregate and store these observations.
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The world state is the agent’s perception of its fluctuating environment. Both preferences and knowledge about the world state form input for the agents negotiation
strategy and are forwarded to knowledge management functions that map an
agent’s strategically relevant knowledge on knowledge bits (“relevant facts”, see
Figure 2) directly exploitable by the agent’s heuristic strategy. The agent’s knowledge based decision making includes provider selection, budget constraint modification, fixing reservation values, determining aggressiveness (reluctance to make
concessions) and other decisions that may help to increase an agent’s payoff when
properly made. Effectors turn decisions into actions. The effectors stack determines the agent’s behavioral degrees of freedom. An agent uses its effectors to
place offers, conclude deals or terminate negotiations.

3

Agent Based Grid Service Transactions

A service level agreement (SLA) allows the definition of mutual guarantees
among service consumers and service providers. It covers job variables detailing
type and composition of the service to be delivered (service level objectives, exclusions), and deal variables that specify the contracting parties, price, time constraints, penalties and other administrative minutiae.
The structure of an SLA for grid resource allocation depends on the application
scenario it is designed for. There is no “one fits all”-solution to SLA design for the
commercial grid. However, there are some basic features that are common or at
least widely reusable (see Table 1). Besides identifying the contracting parties and
the service class, an SLA must enable mutual agreement on the service bundle to
be delivered, the time frame in which delivery is due and monetary compensation.
Non-Negotiables

Negotiables

provider_id

packets

consumer_id

deadline

service_id

price

Table 1: SLA Structure

A typical resource bundle needed to provide application services includes computation, storage, traffic and memory. These resources form what is called a “linked
value group” [Keny02]. For example, computation without bandwidth is useless,
and so is bandwidth without computation. In a scenario where a huge workload of
similar jobs (capacity computing), or a single large, finitely divisible job (capability computing) is assigned to distributed resources, each subjob (“packet”) con-
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sumes a certain resource bundle, type and composition of which depends on the
respective application or a specific job.
A central application of commercial resource allocation in competitive environments will be the instant delivery of grid services on-demand, relieving application servers of peak loads in real-time. Therefore, grid service contracts are executable on the spot on a real-time market. A deadline indicates when the subjob must
be completed. The SLA structure depicted in Table 1 serves as a contracting
framework for resource allocation driven by agent-based “over the counter” negotiations. “Non-negotiables” identify the contractors committed to the SLA and the
service class to be delivered. Besides deadline and price the negotiables section
includes the number of packets to be delivered. A packet is the smallest, nondivisible fraction of a finitely divisible grid job.
A business transaction consists of an information, an agreement and a settlement
phase [Zbor96] (see Figure 3). An electronic market may support one or all of
these phases, depending on user requirements, characteristics of the transaction
object, transaction cost and availability respectively profitability of support tools.
A rough analysis of the market scenario given by a commercial grid implies that
decision support by autonomous systems is required in all phases:
Resource failure as well as spontaneous entry and unpredictable exit of service
providers lead to a highly dynamic topology of the grid and thus to low market
transparency in the information phase. This restricted transparency contradicts the
need for “co-allocation”, i.e. the simultaneous sourcing of complex application
services from multiple providers as required in a commercial grid (see [Chen+02;
Czaj+99]). The complexity must be hidden from users in all transaction phases.
Information
Matching

Ranking

Agreement
Distributive

Integrative

Settlement
Execution

Payment

Figure 3: Transaction Phases and Support Functions

Matching consumers and providers in the information phase as well as negotiation
driven by preference models involves detailed technical descriptions of supply and
demand profiles. Generating these profiles requires expensive expert knowledge,
unless they are generated automatically. Moreover, spontaneously evolving needs,
e.g. in application server load balancing scenarios, call for near real-time demand
communication.
We suggest an agent based approach to transaction support for the commercial
grid. A grid market as designed in the SettleBot project consists of three node
types representing consumers, providers and intermediaries. Each node type (see
Figure 4) hosts an agent that implements the decision support functionality required by the node type. A grid carrier agent (GCA) implements the intermediary
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functions that allow the registration of grid services offered by provider agents. A
grid service resource includes a grid service factory that instantiates services upon
request (see [Fost+02]) and actual physical resources like storage, bandwidth,
computation and memory.
Consumer Node

Provider Node

Principal:

Principal:

Grid Service Consumer

Grid Service Provider

Agent:

Agent:

Consumer Agent

Provider Agent

Resource:
Grid Enabled
Application

Resource:
Grid Service
Resource
Grid Carrier Node
Principal:
Grid Carrier
Agent:
Grid Carrier Agent
Resources:
Compliance DB
Registry

Figure 4: Principals, Agents and Resources of the Commercial Grid

To find offers matching their preference profile, consumer agents retrieve entries
from the registry by querying the GCA. A preference driven ranking of matching
offers completes the information phase (see Figure 3). In the agreement phase,
consumer and provider agents self-interestedly negotiate for distributive agreements that are additionally improved by an integrative search for joint gains. Due
to the limited capacity of a single provider, the ability to assign excess demand for
finitely divisible application services to multiple external providers improves allocation efficiency. Therefore, a single job may require many transactions and the
foregoing negotiations for a set of interdependent contracts. Since grid jobs are
considered divisible, they can be decomposed to single packets, setting the maximum number of providers simultaneously involved to the number of packets. The
settlement phase of a transaction includes service execution and payment (execution of the SLA).
Peak load management as a grid application leads to instantaneous, dynamic needs
for grid services that must be served on short notice. Therefore, thorough decision
support by autonomous systems is not a feature but a must in a commercial grid.
The following sections explain some of the technical details on grid service transactions supported by the suggested agent based framework.
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Preferences

Providers and consumers in a commercial grid are assumed to have preferences of
one contract alternative over another. Considering the variable attributes of the
SLA, a rational provider prefers low resource spending, high revenue and long
deadlines, while a rational consumer prefers high resource usage, low cost and
short-term service delivery. These preferences are modeled by an ordinal utility
function that guides an agent’s decisions in the information and the agreement
phase.
For n attributes, let a = (a1 , a2 ,..., an ) and b = (b1 , b2 ,..., bn ) be alternative outcomes
with a preferred to b by the principal ( a f b ), the agent’s utility function u
must be designed such that u (a) > u (b) . The type of the utility function (multilinear, multiplicative, additive) depends on the degree of dependence among the
attributes. An attribute X 1 is considered preferentially independent of an attribute
X 2 , if the preference ( x1 , x2 ) f ( x1′, x2 ) is independent of the specific value of x2 .

Krantz et al. show that for mutually, preferentially independent attributes, a utility
function takes the form u = f (u1 , u2 ,..., un ) [Kran+71]. For ease of valuation and
utility function design, it is desirable to model the utility function in its well understood additive form
u = ∑ wi ⋅ ui ( xi )

(1)

i

An additive utility function requires all attributes to be mutually, preferentially
independent [KeRa93]. Mutual preferential independence (MPI) is given if any
subset of attributes is preferentially independent of its complement. Among the
attributes packets, deadline and price, there is no subset that must be considered
preferentially dependent of its complement. The MPI assumption reduces utility
function design to determining the subutility functions ui ( xi ) and the weights wi
for each attribute i = (1, 2,..., n) . Since money yields diminishing marginal utility
the utility of price can be modeled using a Bernoulli-concave (logarithmic) subutility function. A rational individual’s claim for risk compensation (risk aversion)
also implies concave subutility functions for the attributes packets and deadline.
For generating its subutility functions, an agent needs to derive aspiration values
( ai ) and reservation values ( ri ) for each of the negotiable attributes from user
constraints while also considering the total job size. Since a divisible job must be
simultaneously assigned to several grid service providers for efficiency purposes,
rprice and rpackets must be dynamically set during negotiations by breaking down the
total values of budget and job size. Since the execution of fractions of the total job
(joblets) by more than one provider is not sequential, rdeadline in a negotiation
equals the total user deadline.

SettleBot: A Negotiation Model for the Agent Based Commercial Grid
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While the reservation values are derived from the user constraints, an agent
autonomously sets its aspiration values (goals). The goals of a consumer agent
concerning the number of packets it assigns to a provider agent ( a packets ) and the
deadline it tries to arrange ( adeadline ) is to maximize the provider agent’s load, considering its performance indicator p [packets/sec] while trying to minimize price
( a price = 0 ).
To value the offers it receives from a provider agent, a consumer agent needs to
weight the three attributes’ subutilities. A user’s internal utility measurement in a
grid scenario considers a time versus money trade-off that can be elicited by
common methods such as the simple multi-attribute rating technique (SMART,
see [WiEd86]) and analytical hierarchical processing (AHP, see [Saat92]).
A grid service provider is a resource owner that frees idle resources, which then
become grid service resources. “Freeing” resources means defining preferences
that govern the assignment of these resources to the provider agent. The provider
agent registers service offers with the grid carrier agent whenever the resources
become available. Resource availability is determined by preference rules that allocate resources either automatically, e.g. when the resource utilization drops below a pre-defined threshold, or by asking the grid service provider for feedback on
what resources may be freed for what time. In typical peak load outsourcing scenarios, server load changes due to events out of control of the resource owner. To
maintain usability and efficiency, unpredictable peak loads and idle times require
a set of preference rules that enable provider agents to autonomously decide their
actions (e.g. “IF CPU usage has been below 30% for 30 minutes, THEN assign
50% of CPU for the next 10 minutes.”). Based on the resource availability prospect given by such rules and the resource consumption of a single service packet,
an agent calculates its performance indicator p [packets/sec] and its maximum
contract duration rdeadline that limits the timeframe of service provision commitments made by a provider agent.
A provider agent dynamically recalculates its rpackets during a negotiation, depending on its p [packets/sec] and the deadline set by the currently exchanged offer.
rprice represents a user’s minimum compensation claim for providing grid services.
Since a rational provider agent wants to sell minimum packets at maximum prices
and long deadlines, its aspiration values are set according to these goals.

158

5
5.1

F. Lang

Transaction Support
Information Phase

In the information phase, provider agents exchange advertisements with consumer
agents via the grid carrier agent’s registry that closely relates to a UDDI registry
when dealing with web services. Referring to the Globus Toolkit, any grid service
publishes service data that allows both to become a stateful service (as opposed to
web services) and to publish attributes describing the provider’s capabilities
[Czaj+03]. When a provider registers with the grid carrier agent’s registry, it posts
the service data that is relevant for provider selection by consumer agents. Besides
data such as a unique identifier by which the provider’s grid service factory is addressed (factory handle) and the factory’s service deadline rdeadline , an ad contains
the service ID of the service the factory is able to instantiate. Each service ID is
bound to a Grid Service Reference (GSR) describing the grid service’s interface.
Based on the resource availability prospect given by the preference rules and the
resource consumption of a service packet, a provider agent additionally calculates
its performance indicator p [packets/sec]. The performance indicator is the key
selection criterion for consumer agents.
select
Grid Service
Consumer

use

Grid Enabled
Application

assign

rank

Consumer
Agent

reply
query

Grid Service
Provider

free

Grid Service
Resource

assign

Provider
Agent

Grid
Carrier
Agent
match

register

Figure 5: Object Calls in the Information Phase

A consumer agent in search of a specific service queries the GCA’s registry for
the corresponding service ID and obtains a list of factory handles matching the
query along with the performance indicators and service deadlines (see Figure 5).
After ranking the provider list by performance indicators, a consumer agent selects
the providers to negotiate with from the list. In the example given by Table 2, a
consumer agent plans to distribute a divisible grid job of 10000 packets among the
best performing providers. When first entering the agreement phase, the consumer
agent selects the ranks 1 to 4 for simultaneous negotiation, totaling a maximum
contracting volume of 10,243 packets. In case of unsuccessful negotiations, the
consumer agent repeatedly selects provider agents to negotiate with by the above
scheme until the total number of packets required by the grid job is contracted.
Thus, we divide a multi-source allocation problem (“co-allocation”) into a sequence of bilateral negotiations.
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Rank

Factory
Handle

Factory Max
Packets

Total Max
Packets

1

b

12.5

2

g

6.5

450

5,625

5,625

360

2,340

7,965

3

a

3.5

4

d

3.3

500

1,750

9,715

420

528

10,243

5

h

0.8

350

280

10,523

6

c

0.3

250

75

10,598

Table 2: Example Provider Ranking in the Information Phase

5.2

Distributive Negotiation Phase

In distributive negotiations, the agents are claiming value at the expense of their
opponent (“win/lose-negotiations”). The agents use a competitive negotiation
strategy to decide how to divide a fixed resource, i.e. how to get the most out of a
grid service contract for themselves. The result of this distributive phase is a preliminary contract that at least yields both agents’ minimum utility threshold (reservation utility). Asymmetric utility distribution among two contractors indicates
to what extent an agent has “won” or “lost” a negotiation. By using a more sophisticated strategy or by exploiting a weak bargaining position of their opponent, an
agent may gain a bigger share of the pie.
A negotiation protocol is a transaction processing framework that contains the basic rules of the agents’ interaction. SettleBot proposes a two-phase negotiation
protocol. The first phase (distributive phase) supports sequential alternating offer
exchange among two agents that apply heuristic strategies to gain advantage over
their competitors under incomplete information, i.e. private valuation functions.
The second phase (integrative phase) aims at finding joint gains while maintaining
the utility distribution outcome of the first phase.
Agent A

Evaluate
Offer

Agent B

Generate
Offer

Accept
Offer

Terminate
Negotiation
Decide
Continuation

Decide
Continuation

Terminate
Negotiation

Accept
Offer
Generate
Offer

Evaluate
Offer

Figure 6: Negotiation Protocol (Distributive Phase)
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Figure 6 depicts the sequence of decisions made by the negotiating agents in the
distributive phase. A consumer agent A that has selected a matching provider B
initializes a distributive negotiation by generating an initial offer
x A → B,t = ( x1t , x2t ,..., xnt ) . In subsequent rounds, the initial attribute values xit are
modified by an offer modification function ∆ ( π ) that represents an agent’s con0

0

0

0

0

cession strategy. An agent’s strategy takes into account the agent’s knowledge
about the user’s goals (e.g. attribute weights), knowledge about the market environment (e.g. supply/demand ratio) and knowledge about the opponent (e.g. its
Quality of Service-rating). All the knowledge an agent acquires by reading its sensors, by preference elicitation and by communicating with the application interface is summed up as its belief about the world state π . If the world state changes
during an ongoing negotiation, the agent adapts its strategy accordingly, e.g. increases or reduces its concession rate. The modification function ∆i ( π ) has the
range [0;1] and thus ∆i ( π ) ⋅ ϕi gives the proportion of the maximum concession
ϕi = ai − ri currently considered strategically appropriate by the agent. Hereinafter,
all functions referring to π are subject to knowledge processing optimization by
genetic optimization (see below).
A modified attribute value offered at time t is given by
xit ( π ) = xit 0 + ∆ i ( π ) ⋅ ϕi .

(2)

The set of modification functions
⎛ t - t0 ⎞
∆ i (π ) = ⎜
⎟
⎝ t crit (π ) ⎠

βi ( π )

(3)

represents aggressive (or “Boulware”), neutral and defensive (or “Conceder”)
concession strategies. We agree with Faratin, Sierra and Jennings on the suitability
of such strategy types in terms of individual utility maximization and allocation
efficiency [Fara+98]. The factor βi ( π ) determines the curvature of the modification function and thus the strategy type. Figure 7 shows the outcome of a negotiation for a grid service where the agents apply different modification strategies. In
the example given by Figure 7, the nearly linear (neutral) modification strategy of
the consumer agent yields higher utility than the aggressive strategy applied by the
opposing provider agent.
t crit ( π ) is an agent’s time limit for a negotiation. If a negotiation of two agents A

and B starts at time t 0A ↔ B , an agent A reaches its maximum concession at time
A
A
t 0A ↔ B + t crit
( π ) . If time t 0A ↔ B + t crit
( π ) has elapsed and agent A gains no more utility
increase from new offers submitted by agent B, it terminates the negotiation. Like
βi ( π ) , the world state dependent strategy control variable t crit (π ) determines an
agent’s negotiation stance (aggressive, neutral, defensive). An agent with a rela-
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tively short t crit (π ) shows defensive behavior by quickly spending its concession
contingent to avoid termination by the other party.

Figure 7: Negotiating Agents’ Modification Strategies

The agent’s utility function is designed such that u A (a1A , a2A ,..., a3A ) = 1 and
u A ( r1A , r2A ,..., r3A ) = 0 . An important element of a negotiating agent’s strategy is at
what utility level a counteroffer is acceptable. Therefore, an agent determines its
reservation utility utarget against the current world state, using rules found by test
runs with a genetic algorithm. Preferably, this threshold states a value such that an
offer is not accepted if in succeeding negotiations a better result can be attained. A
high utarget increases the risk of termination without reaching agreement, while a
low threshold value may waste utility which could have been attained. Along with
other strategy control functions, the mapping function utarget (π ) is subject to genetic optimization using the GeneLab simulation environment.
The GeneLab platform simulates an agent based commercial grid and allows finding heuristic negotiation strategies by a genetic algorithm (GA). There are two
major fields of explorative simulations conducted with GeneLab, the search for
static and for dynamic strategies. The success of a static strategy does not depend
on the dynamically changing world state but only on its fit with the negotiation
mechanism. The SettleBot project focuses the search for dynamic strategies that
change the agent’s behavior depending on its perception of the world state. The

162

F. Lang

agent’s view of the world state is derived by processing sensor readings at runtime. An agent’s decision core links its strategy control variables to its sensor
readings by mapping rules that are genetically optimized using GeneLab. To get
more representative fitness values, the GeneLab GA uses a fitness function that
calculates agent fitness as the average utility an agent gains from several negotiations. The floating point numbers representing an agent’s strategy control variables are encoded as Gray code [Pres+92] to improve numerical optimization.
Compared to regular binary coding, Gray-encoded numerical parameters behave
smoothly under bit mutation, thereby allowing a local stochastic search for fitness
maxima. The agents entering the mating pool are picked from the population by
tournament selection [GoDe91].

1

3

2

Figure 8: SettleBot GeneLab: Exploring Negotiation Strategies for the Commercial Grid

Figure 8 shows a simple example of a test run with a population of 250 agents that
aims at the optimization of the function t crit (π ) that determines an agent’s critical
time limit depending on its world state perception π , specifically πother.tcrit , which
is the average time limit of the other negotiating party as observed by the agent.
The test run served to prove the suspected interdependence between an agent’s
market power in terms of current supply and demand ratio and its defensiveness in
terms of t crit as a strategy control variable. Chart 1 of Figure 8 shows an approximate evolutionary trend to t crit (π ) = πother.tcrit ⋅ 0.5 for consumer agents when the
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market power ratio is 7:3 in favor of the supply side (see Chart 2). The frequency
distribution depicted by Chart 3 indicates a strong fitness dominance of consumer
agents adjusting their t crit to half of that of their opponent. Chart 3 shows that almost the entire population has set their corresponding strategy factor to ≈ 0.5 after
562 Generations.
Other than t crit (π ) and utarget (π ) , optimizations done with GeneLab’s GA engine
include finding dominant mapping functions ri (π ) and βi ( π ) . The idea behind
dynamic reservation values ri (π ) and dynamic concession stance βi ( π ) is that
rational agents are expected to concede more on less important attributes and vice
versa. Several test runs aimed at analyzing advantageous processing rules that optimize ri ( π ) (strategy example given below) and βi ( π ) depending on the attribute weights wi . Several simulations and scripted test runs in dynamically changing
negotiation settings proved that successful agents improve their average utility by
proportionally adjusting their ri ( π ) to the attribute weights. Our simulation results
can be generalized by the strategy
ri (π ) = ri + ( ai − ri ) ⋅ ε ⋅ wi ⋅ n with ε ∈ + such that
n

∑ w ⋅ u (r + (a
i

i

i

i

− ri ) ⋅ ε ⋅ wi ⋅ n ) = utarget ( π )

(4)
(5)

i =1

Thereby, the reservation value ri of each attribute i is shifted towards the aspiration value ai , depending on utarget ( π ) and the weights wi . As a result, an agent that
generates offers according to these ri will not fall short of its currently claimed
utility utarget ( π ) and will have more restrictive reservation values for important attributes i with wi ⋅ n > 1 , given that

n

∑w
i =1

i

= 1 . Test runs show that the above strat-

egy performs best if the negotiating agents’ attribute weight profiles differ largely
from each other. Tested with random attribute weights, an agent applying the
strategy gains an average utility surplus of 16% over agents that do not modify
reservation values according to their attribute weights.
The result of the distributive phase is a preliminary contract that represents both
agents’ individual bargaining success. An agent’s success varies widely depending
on what sensor data is available and how this sensor data is processed to control
the strategy control variables. As expected, the distributive phase performs below
Pareto efficiency since utility functions are private knowledge and both agents act
strictly on behalf of their own self-interest. For further improvement of the preliminary contract, the agents subsequently enter an integrative phase of their negotiations when preliminary agreement was reached.
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Integrative Negotiation Phase

The integrative phase aims at enlarging the pie, i.e. finding contract modifications
that result in joint utility gains for both of the agents (“win/win-negotiations”).
The goal of SettleBot’s two phased negotiation mechanism is to find Paretoundominated contracts by integrative negotiation while preserving asymmetric
utility gains obtained by superior strategy in the distributive phase. We argue that
a rational agent with a strategy to exploit its strong bargaining position does not
opt into a negotiation protocol that aims at Pareto-efficient contracts if there is an
alternative protocol that allows to profit on its advantageous situation at the expense of its opponent.
In the integrative phase, the agents search for mutual improvements by exchanging offers that are modifications of the preliminary contract. Therefore, an agent
randomly modifies the preliminary contract by a Gaussian distribution, such that
there is a high probability of minor modification and a low probability of major
modification for each of the attributes. If an agent A finds a modification that improves its utility, i.e. finds a favorable trade-off of attribute values, it sends the
modification to its opponent B as a new contract proposal. If the offer is accepted
by B, there’s a new preliminary contract. In any case, following an alternating offer protocol, B generates the next modified contract based on the current preliminary contract until no further improvements are found. Since utility functions are
private and none of the agents (except the “Auditor” agent used in our simulation,
see Figure 9) knows whether the Pareto frontier has been reached, A and B need a
suitable alternative termination rule. 1000 offer exchanges and no improvement
has proved a feasible restriction in our simulations with the MISTRESS simulation environment for the integrative phase. Pareto-undominated contracts are usually found in well below 1000 rounds (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Approximating the Pareto Frontier in the Integrative Phase
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Since modifications are random and both agents’ apply neutral decision functions
that accept a modification if there is a utility gain (see below), the expected total
utility gain in the integrative phase is approximately equal for both agents. However, the non-deterministic nature of the integrative phase results in certain deviations from each agent’s “fair utility share”. In 18 percent of the cases, the deviation from the agents’ fair share exceeds 10 percent. In general however, the resulting contracts maintain the utility surplus the agents achieved in the first phase,
while approximating undominated contracts (points on the Pareto frontier, see
Figure 9).
Agent 2

Agent 1

p

p

p

∆u

∆u

∆u

Defensive

Neutral

Aggressive

Defensive

76% / 76%

26% / 95%

25% / 94%

Neutral

95% / 26%

81% / 81%

83% / 78%

Aggressive

94% / 25%

78% / 83%

76% / 76%

Table 3: Utility Gains in the Integrative Phase

Table 3 shows the average utility gains of agents applying different strategies in
percent of the maximum possible gain. The defensive strategy accepts a new contract with a non-zero probability even if there is a utility loss. Aggressive strategies claim a higher utility gain than neutral strategies. We found that the neutral
strategy outperforms the aggressive strategy at a small margin of 83/78 due to the
aggressive strategy’s reluctance to accept small utility increases, thus there is no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from a neutral to an aggressive strategy. Defensive strategies are inferior to all non-defensive strategies. Therefore, the neutral vs.
neutral strategy pair is a mutual best response (Nash equilibrium).

6

Conclusion and Further Work

The SettleBot project extends a growing body of research that applies genetic algorithms to decision and negotiation support. While many research efforts focus
decision strategies that are purely mechanism dependent, the SettleBot project
aims at developing dynamic decision strategies. Dynamic strategies consider live
sensor data measuring the dynamically evolving world state to reduce the downsides of incomplete information and to leverage unilateral knowledge gains for
higher utility. Beginning with Axelrod’s work on strategy evolution in repeated
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games [Axel87], related research efforts have analyzed superior decision strategies
by evolutionary computing for both game theoretic and heuristic mechanisms
[Dwor+96; Gerd+03; Oliv94].
Grid and Agent technology are increasingly regarded complementary [Fost+04].
Currently, both technologies emerge as a combined field of research. Besides finding solutions for the technological requirements of grid markets [Czaj+02;
Czaj+03; Fost+02], many publications focus the economic engineering of resource
allocation mechanisms [Chel+04; Chen+02; Gagl+95; Keny02; ReNi98; Wols+01].
Finding applicable mechanisms for the negotiation of service level agreements
among grid partners is just one of many problems to be solved when implementing even the first stage of a commercial grid (see section 1). Besides security and
platform compatibility issues, successful deployment of a commercial grid requires monitoring and penalization of deviations from service level agreements. In
scientific grid applications, quality of service often follows a “best effort”approach (soft QoS-constraints). Since “best effort-service” has near-zero economic value [Chel+04], there must be hard guarantees on quality of service in a
commercial grid. Therefore, several research efforts aim at developing grid architectures that allow monitoring of hard QoS-constraints agreed upon by the contracting parties. We propose a reputation mechanism to enforce the contractors’
compliance with the service level agreement. In the SettleBot system, compliance
data may be logged and published by the grid carrier agent. Negotiating agents
may query the grid carrier agent for another agent’s QoS-ratio q , i.e. the percentage of past transactions properly settled. In the information phase, another agent’s
QoS-ratio may serve as an additional ranking/selection-criterion. For example, a
consumer agent A ranks a provider agent B by its expected performance
E ( p B ) = q B ⋅ p B [packets/sec]. In the agreement phase, we expect q B to have a
distinct impact on a rational agent’s behavior when presented to the agent as another knowledge bit forming input to its negotiation strategy.

As yet, we do not apply dynamic strategies in the integrative phase. However, we
are working on a model based on a probabilistic Bayes tree that allows an agent to
estimate its opponent’s goals by analyzing another agent’s behavior in the distributive phase. The resulting estimated goal model allows improved offer generation in both the distributive and the integrative phase.
Our future overall research goal is to propose a generic knowledge driven strategy
for the commercial grid. To achieve this, we will analyze the strategic implications
of information availability (reputation data, forecasts, trade history, opponent log)
and its impact on welfare and individual success in the grid economy.
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